Out of Connecticut, and the “Guomindang” 過民黨 (get it?)

Hello again!

First, some update:  my posting has of late been pretty sporadic here at UPJ, but now (finally!) I am finished with my dissertation (titled Moral Personhood in Confucius and Aristotle), and in the midst of making a move from cold northeast Connecticut to somewhat less cold southwest Ohio, where I’ll be starting in the fall as Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Dayton.  I may also be in India for a few weeks sometime during the summer–so I’ll be all over the place.  Anyway, during the summer, I have a bit of time to catch up on some projects, and work on a couple of papers developing some topics I touched on in my dissertation–and also to post more stuff here at UPJ…

One of the things I’ve been thinking (or worrying, I’m not sure which) about in connection with one of these projects is the use of the term dang 黨 in the Analects.  In particular, 4.7 makes an interesting use of this term:

子曰:“人之過也,各於其黨。觀過,斯知仁矣.”  The master said: “The mistakes of people are in each case (ge) attributable (yu) to their group (dang). Observe their mistakes, and you will know whether humanity (ren) obtains.

There are a couple of issues with dang in 4.7.  The issue I’m currently occupied with is whether or not dang should be taken as a good or a bad thing in this passage.  I offer some reason in the dissertation (and the paper I’m working on) to think it’s neutral, but the origin of one’s agency.  Early in the passage it seems to be connected with negative qualities specifically, rather than with positive ones.  One’s dang is the source of one’s mistakes (guo).  I take dang  here to be something like “group” or “community” generally, connected to the uses of dang elsewhere in the Analects to talk about the “village”.  The seemingly negative connotation in 4.7 might suggest that dang here means something like “gang” or “clique”, a communal entity through which one could gain certain vices but not (in general) virtues.  But I think this might be based on a misreading of the negative connotations of dang in 4.7.  

The second part of 4.7 seems to suggest that ren can be present in a dang, in just the way that the first part of the passage suggests that guo are present in a dang, rather than in an individual primarily.  The persons we are examining, 4.7 suggests, are in communities, in a particular dang or another.  The guo (mistakes) which individuals in the dang make are attributable to their dang (although 4.7 is not clear about this, I offer some interpretive explanation of this “attributability” elsewhere, though I won’t get into it here), in that the dang is at least partly responsible for the guo.  Is, then, the lack of guo in the community also attributable to the dang one is associated with?  I think this must be the case.  It seems odd at least that the author of Analects 4.7 would have thought that social influence from the groups one is integrated into can cause one to act badly, but cannot cause one to act well.  

Note that the interpretation that individual virtue might counteract the possibly corrosive influence of the dang is a stretch here, as 4.7 instructs us to observe the guo of an individual or group (it is not specific).  Presumably, it is in the absence of particular guo or the mildness of the guo that one can discover ren in the individual or group.  It is only on the first of these readings, that guo is absent in an individual, that the “individual virtue counteracting the influence of the dang” interpretation can be maintained.  But if this is the correct reading of the second part of 4.7, why talk about guo being attributable to one’s dang in the first part of 4.7?  If there are any guo made by the individual, this is because of the dang’s influence, and if we observe that an individual makes no guo, then we can thereby see this individual is ren?  This just invites the response: “what if one is simply not part of a dang?  Then they also do not have the guo associated with a dang (no matter how they act or what kind of character they have), but this cannot mean that they are ren.”  Then, the “individual virtue” proponent has to maintain that 4.7 means to limit the cases to those within a dang–saying that the ren individual is able to counteract the influence of the dang through his individual virtue, such that the guo other members of the dang are making are not made by this individual.  This view basically says, then, that only the ren individual is autonomous, whereas others have no power to resist the negative influence of the dang to which they belong.  

There are a number of problems with this view, however–not the least of which being that it seems to make the instructions given in 4.7 sound awkward.  If the above view is true, wouldn’t it be easier to discover whether an individual is ren by observing the extent to which their actions diverge from those of the dang to which they belong?  

One response to “Out of Connecticut, and the “Guomindang” 過民黨 (get it?)

  1. Hello there. Congratulations on your new job. This weblog article gives me a new view on the 4.7 piece. Since my English is bad, so please allow me to use Chinese Mandarin to represent my humble and vulnerable opinions. In this way I may be able to express myself more precisely.

    言外话,Guomingdang的中文是“國民黨”,而非“過民黨”。不过不是太了解您说Guomingdang想要表达的是什么意思。

    我不太确定您所引用的4.7的英文翻译者是谁。但我个人以为,可能还是James Legge的翻译比较妥帖。Legge的翻译是:

    The Master said, “The faults of men are characteristic of the class to which they belong. By observing a man’s faults, it may be known that he is virtuous.”

    按照朱熹以及尊崇朱子的钱穆先生的诠释,“黨”就是“類”的意思,是中性的。程子曰:“人之有過,各有黨類,如君子過於厚,小人過於薄。君子過於愛,小人過於忍。楊樹達《論語疏證》與錢穆先生《論語新解》都引述了以下的故事:”子路喪姊,期而不除,孔子非之。子路曰:「不幸寡兄弟,不忍除之。」昔人以此為觀過知仁之例。

    “過”既可以是“過猶不及”的“過”(which means like OD or crossing the line),也可以是“咎”之義。子路的這個例子可以理解為子路內心的仁善過分擴充以至於沒有遵循禮的規定“期而除之”。所以,從子路的fault中可以發現子路是個有仁心的人。這算是對“觀過,斯知仁矣”的一種解釋。

    我不確定attributable的翻譯是否合適,但我覺得先人Legge的characteristic是貼切的。在孔子眼中,人似乎只分兩種(就學問與德性而言),即君子和小人,或者說勞心者和勞力者。所以程子才會說君子過於如何如何、小人過於如何如何。這並非是說個人的過錯源於或者說可歸於團隊的影響。這個“各于其黨”只是說“什麼樣的人會犯什麼樣的錯”。

    “What if one is simply not part of a dang?”這個問題非常引發我的興趣和思考。不過,先秦諸子(除了楊朱老莊之流)即便主張不同,但都是認同人、民必須在社會中有相應的政治地位、名分、權責、義務的。所以,儒家的理論有可能回答不了“人要是脫離群體會如何如何”的問題。

    以上是我的陋見,抛磚引玉,以期賢者正解。個人不足之處,望請您指正。

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